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Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters
due to Structural Collapse
Fire fighters are frequently injured or killed when burning structures collapse without warning.
Implement and review occupational
safety programs and standard operat-
ing procedures.
Ensure that the incident commander
conducts an initial size-up and risk
assessment of the incident scene
before beginning interior fire fighting.
Ensure that the incident commander
always maintains accountability for all
personnel at a fire sceneboth by
location and function.
Establish rapid intervention crews
(RICs)often called rapid intervention
teamsand make sure they are posi-
tioned to respond immediately to
emergencies.
Ensure that at  least four fire fighters
are on the scene before beginning
interior fire fighting at a structural fire
(two fire fighters inside the structure
and two outside).
Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous
areas (such as burning or suspected
unsafe structures) to maintain two-way
communications with  the incident
commander.
Ensure that standard operating proce-
dures and equipment are adequate and
sufficient to support radio traffic at
multiple-responder fire scenes.
Provide all fire fighters with personal
alert safety system (PASS) devices and
make sure that they wear and activate
them when they are involved in fire fight-
ing, rescue, or other hazardous duties.
Conduct prefire planning and inspections
that cover all building materials and com-
ponents of a structure.
Transmit an audible tone or alert immedi-
ately when conditions become unsafe for
fire fighters.
Establish a collapse zone around build-















Fire departments should take the following steps to minimize the risk of
injury and death to fire fighters during structural fire fighting:
Please tear out and post.  Distribute copies to workers.
See back of sheet to order complete Alert.
For additional information, see NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths
of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (DHHS [NIOSH] Publication No.
99146). Single copies of the Alert are available free from the following:
Publications Dissemination, EID
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           Fire fighters are frequently injured or killed when burning structures collapse without warning.
Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters
due to Structural Collapse
The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in
preventing injuries and deaths of U.S. fire
fighters due to structural collapse during fire-
fighting operations. Structural collapse of a
building during fire fighting is a leading cause
of death among fire fighters. Such collapse is
very difficult to predict during fire fighting,
and it usually occurs without warning.
Fire departments should implement and re-
view occupational safety programs and stan-
dard operating procedures to prevent serious
injuries and deaths of fire fighters.  NIOSH
recommends that fire departments take 10
essential steps to minimize the risk of injury
and death to fire fighters during structural fire
fighting:
1.  Ensure that the incident commander con-
ducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of
the incident scene before beginning interior
fire fighting.
2.  Ensure that the incident commander always
maintains accountability for all personnel at
a fire sceneboth by location and function.
3.  Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs)
often called rapid intervention teamsand
make sure they are positioned to respond
immediately to emergencies.
4.  Ensure that at  least four fire fighters are
on the scene before beginning interior fire
fighting at a structural fire (two fire fighters
inside the structure and two outside).
5.  Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous
areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe
structures) to maintain two-way communica-
tions with  the incident commander.
6.  Ensure that standard operating procedures
and equipment are adequate and sufficient to
support radio traffic at multiple-responder fire
scenes.
7.  Provide all fire fighters with personal alert
safety system (PASS) devices and make sure
that they wear and activate them when they
are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other
hazardous duties.
8.  Conduct prefire planning and inspections
that cover all building materials and compo-
nents of a structure.
9.  Transmit an audible tone or alert immedi-
ately when conditions become unsafe for fire
fighters.
10.  Establish a collapse zone around build-
ings with parapet walls.
NIOSH requests that the information in this
Alert be brought to the attention of all U.S.
fire fightersincluding those in the largest
metropolitan and the smallest rural depart-
ments by the following: fire chiefs and fire
commissioners and administrators, editors of
trade journals and other publications, safety
and health officials, State fire marshals, unions




The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
reports that 968 fire fighters died  between 1989
and 1998 [NFPA 1999].  Nearly half of these deaths
(443) occurred on the fireground.  Furthermore,
structural collapse caused 56 (18%) of the 316
fire fighter deaths at structure fires. A structural
collapse often results in multiple fire fighter
fatalities.  For example, during this time period,
43 fire fighters were fatally injured by collaps-
ing materials at 11 fires.
As these statistics show, structural collapse of any
part of a building (floors, walls, ceilings, roofs,
or structural members) during fire fighting is a
leading cause of death among fire fighters.  The
potential for structural collapse is one of the most
difficult factors to predict during initial size-up
and ongoing fire fighting.  Structural collapse
usually occurs without warning.  For example,
the floor of a burning structure may suddenly col-
lapse, spilling fire fighters into a burning inferno.
Or a sudden roof collapse may trap fire fighters
inside the structure. After arrival at a fire scene,
the incident commander must consider numerous
variables to determine the structural integrity of
a burning building [Dunn 1988]:
Fire size and location
Length of time the fire has been burning
Conditions on arrival
Size of the building (single or multistory, floor area,
and height)
Age of the building (deterioration of structural
members, evidence of weathering,  use of light-
weight materials in new construction)
Presence of combustible materials
Occupancy
Renovations or modifications to the building
Previous fires
Supported loads (such as roof-top heating and cool-
ing systems) that might affect the integrity of the
structure
Exposures that might pose fire and smoke hazards
to nearby people or buildings
Resources at the scene for extinguishing the fire
(number of apparatus, fire-fighting personnel, wa-
ter supply, and auxiliary appliances)
Other factors such as the time of day (day or night)
and weather conditions (extreme heat or cold)
OSHA
State and local government employees (such as fire
fighters) are exempt from Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) stan-
dards.  However, in the 25 States currently autho-
rized by OSHA to run an occupational safety and
health program, all OSHA regulations apply to both
public and private employees.
Current OSHA regulations that apply to fire fighters
include 29 CFR* 1910.134 (Respiratory protection)
and 29 CFR 1910.156 (Fire brigades).  In 29 CFR
1910.134, employers are required to provide res-
pirators suitable for the purpose intended and to
establish and maintain a respirator protection program.
The standard also states that if fire fighters must enter
an area that is immediately dangerous to life and
health (IDLH), at least two must enter the area to-
gether and remain in visual or voice contact with
one another at all times. They must also conduct
interior fire fighting using self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA).  In addition, at least two prop-
erly equipped and trained fire fighters must be
   positioned outside the IDLH atmosphere,
   account for the interior team(s), and
   remain capable of rapid rescue of the interior
       team(s).
In 29 CFR 1910.156, OSHA lists the requirements
for organizing, training, and equipping fire brigades
established by the employer.
*Code of Federal Regulations. See CFR in references.
CURRENT STANDARDS
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NFPA
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
recommends in NFPA 1500 that all fire departments
establish a policy of providing and operating at  "the
highest possible levels of safety and health for all
members" [NFPA  1997a].  Several NFPA stan-
dards apply to structural fire fighting operations:
NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building
Construction, specifies methods of classifying
types of construction and fire resistance ratings
[NFPA 1995a].
NFPA 1404, Standard for a Fire Department
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Program,
specifies the minimum requirements for a res-
piratory protection training program in a fire
department [NFPA 1996].
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department
Occupational Safety and Health Program,
specifies (1) the minimum requirements for
a fire department's occupational safety and
health program; (2) the safety procedures for
members involved in rescue, fire suppression,
and related activities; and (3) the integration
of risk management into regular functions of
the incident commander  [NFPA 1997a].
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department In-
cident Management System, defines the essen-
tial elements of an incident management sys-
tem  [NFPA 1995b].
Other relevant NFPA Standards include the fol-
lowing:
NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble
for Structural Fire Fighting,  which includes
protective coat, pants, helmet, gloves, hood,
and footware [NFPA 1997b]
NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-
Contained Breathing Apparatus for the Fire
Service [NFPA 1997c]
NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert
Safety Systems (PASS) for Fire Fighters.
[NFPA 1998].
The following case reports describe incidents in-
volving fire fighter injuries and deaths due to struc-
tural collapse. They were investigated by the
NIOSH Fire Fighter Investigation Team using the
Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
(FACE) protocol.
CASE 1Commercial Structure Fire in
California
On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter (a captain)
died at a fire scene while trying to exit from a com-
mercial structure.  The first unit on the scene re-
ported light smoke showing from a one-story com-
mercial building.  A ventilation team proceeded to
the roof of the building and began ventilating. An-
other team began forcible entry into the front of the
building through two metal security doors (which
took 7½ to 9 minutes to force open).  While fire
companies waited for the front door to be opened,
fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.
Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened
by the ventilation crew.
About the same time, three engine crews advanced
hand lines through the front door to determine the
origin of the fire.  Approximately 15 feet inside the
front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy
smoke and near-zero visibility.  The engine crews
advanced their lines 30 to 40 feet inside the build-
ing, but could not locate the fire.  Conditions con-
tinued to deteriorate rapidly, so the officers on the
engine crews ordered their fire fighters to exit from
the building.  During this time, the victim became
separated from his crew and remained in the build-
ing.  About 1 minute later, a partial roof collapse
blocked the front door.  The rapid intervention team
subsequently located the victim.  Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation was performed immediately and en
route to the hospital, where the victim was pro-
nounced dead. The medical examiner listed smoke
inhalation and burns as the cause of death [NIOSH
1998a].
Applicable Recommendations: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9
in the Recommendations section.
CASE REPORTS
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CASE 2Floor Collapse in a Single-Family
Dwelling in Kentucky
On February 17, 1997, one male fire fighter died
and another was injured in a fire in a single-family
dwelling.  When the fire company arrived at the
fire scene, the district major reported that heavy
smoke was coming from the roof area of the dwell-
ing.  Two male fire fighters pulled two 1¾-inch
charged lines from their assigned engine and pro-
ceeded toward the dwelling.  After knocking down
a ceiling fire, they entered the dwelling,  apparently
without the district majors knowledge.  On enter-
ing the front door, both fell through the floor into
the basement.  The fire fighters landed at the fires
origin in extremely hot water and heavy black
smoke.  Neither was equipped with a radio, so an
emergency transmission to the incident commander
was impossible. The fire fighters manually triggered
their PASS devices, but the pumps and engines
operating on the street made it impossible to hear
the alarm. About 8 minutes into the operation, the
district major discovered that two fire fighters were
missing. A lieutenant noticed the hose lines lead-
ing into the front door.  He crawled along the
ground, following them to the front door, where he
saw a light shining up from the basement.  A ladder
was lowered. One fire fighter grabbed the ladder
and was pulled from the basement. He stated that
another fire fighter was still in the basement.  After
numerous search efforts, the second fire fighter was
found (about 53 minutes into the operation). Eight
to ten minutes after the two fire fighters had entered
the structure, their SCBAs had run out of air and they
had tried to breathe entrained air from the water spray
in their lines. The first fire fighter was injured but sur-
vived. The second fire fighter died from asphyxiation
due to smoke inhalation  [NIOSH 1997].
Applicable recommendations:  2, 3, and 5
in the Recommendations section.
CASE 3Sudden Roof Collapse of a Burning
Auto Parts Store in Virginia
On March 18, 1996, two male fire fighters died
while fighting  a  fire  in  an  auto  parts  store.  At
1129 hours, a 911 call to the fire dispatch reported
sparking in the fuse box  at  a  local  auto  parts
store.  At  1135  hours,  fire  fighters  arrived,  not
knowing that a power company service truck had
accidentally broken the neutral line to the auto parts
store. The store did not have adequate electrical
grounds; thus all electrical circuits in the store su-
perheated and started a series of fires above the
dropped ceiling.  A lieutenant and a fire fighter from
Engine 3 went into the auto parts store with a
charged 1¾-inch line to  locate the origin of the fire
(only light smoke was showing inside). All employ-
ees had left the store and all lights were out. At 1149
hours, the lieutenant inside the store radioed that
they were in trouble and could not get out.  How-
ever, because of heavy radio traffic, the battalion
chief did not understand the transmission.  At 1150
hours, the fire rapidly accelerated without warning
and the entire roof (containing 50-foot wood trusses
supporting heavy heating and cooling units) col-
lapsed into the store.  Both fire fighters died from
burns and smoke inhalation [NIOSH 1996].
Applicable recommendations:  2, 3, 6, and 8 in
the Recommendations section.
CASE 4Parapet Wall Collapse during a
Warehouse Fire in Vermont
On September 5, 1998, one fire fighter died when
a parapet wall collapsed on him during a ware-
house fire. Four fire departments were dispatched
to fight a fire in a warehouse  that stored recycled
paper.  The warehouse was built in the late 1800s
of brick masonry frame with heavy wood truss
construction.  The first arriving chief of an en-
gine company saw smoke issuing from below the
Photo courtesy of Bradley Whitcomb, St. Johnsbury Fire Department,
St. Johnsbury, Vermont
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eaves at the rear of the structure. He decided not to
enter the building but to "surround and drown" it.
When the Engine 3 crew arrived, they were ordered
to place their engine at the north end of the struc-
ture and attack from the exterior.  One of the fire
fighters from Engine 3 approached the structure to
open the large, barn-like doors and enable the fire
fighters to attack from the exterior.  The fire fighter
then returned to the hose line and discovered that
the doors had closed behind him (they were self
closing).  He was returning to prop them open when,
without warning, the parapet wall above the doors
suddenly collapsed on him. He died as a result of
multiple crushing injuries [NIOSH 1998b].
Applicable recommendations:  8 and 10 in the Rec-
ommendations section.
Many complex factors are present when fighting a
structural fire, and conditions can deteriorate rap-
idly at the fire scenesometimes with little or no
warning.  Fire departments need to be constantly
aware of the potential for a structural collapse and
take appropriate steps to ensure the safety of fire
fighters.
To minimize the risk of injury and death to fire fight-
ers during structural fire fighting, NIOSH recommends
that fire departments (1) implement and review occu-
pational safety programs and standard operating pro-
cedures and (2) take the following steps:
1.  Ensure that the incident commander conducts
an initial size-up and risk assessment at the inci-
dent scene before beginning interior fire fighting.
This size-up and risk assessment should continue
throughout the incident and should  include evalua-
tion of the situation, fire-fighting strategy, tactical plan-
ning, plan evaluation and revision, and operational
command and control.  A primary concern is
whether the scene involves an imminent life-threat-
ening situation that may require rescue.
An initial size-up and assessment of a fire should
include an evaluation of the following factors
[Dunn 1988]:
Fire size and location
Length of time the fire has been burning
Conditions on arrival
Size of the building (single or multistory,
floor area, and height)
Age of the building (deterioration of
structural members, evidence of weathering,
use of lightweight materials in new
construction)
Presence of combustible materials
Occupancy
Renovations or modifications to the
building
Previous fires
Supported loads (such as roof-top heating
and cooling systems) that might affect the
integrity of the structure
Exposures that might pose fire and smoke
hazards to nearby people or buildings
Resources at the scene for extinguishing the
fire (number of apparatus, fire-fighting
personnel, water supply, and auxiliary
appliances)
Other factors such as the time of day (day
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2.  Ensure that the incident commander always
maintains close accountability for all person-
nel at the fire sceneboth by location and
function.
Accountability for all fire fighters at a fire scene
is essential and constitutes one of the incident
commander's most important duties. Personnel
accountability systems should be integrated into
the incident command policy and used to track
locations and assignments of companies operat-
ing at a fire scene.  Personnel accountability sys-
tems include accountability checks that require
the incident commander to communicate with
officers at each level within the incident com-
mand system.
3.  Ensure that at least four fire fighters are
on the scene before entering a structure and
beginning interior fire fighting at a structural
fire (two fire fighters inside the structure and
two outside).
The NFPA and the OSHA state that at a minimum
four persons (each with full protective clothing and
respiratory protection) are needed to assure the
safety of those working inside a burning structure.
Two fire fighters may be inside the structure, but
two must remain outside. The team members should
be in visual, audible, or electronic communication
with each other to coordinate all activities and de-
termine whether emergency rescue is needed.
4.  Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs) and
make sure they are positioned to respond imme-
diately to emergencies.
The primary purpose for an RIC is to provide a dedi-
cated and specialized team of fire fighters ready to
rescue fire fighters who become trapped in a burn-
ing structure.  An RIC is vitally important at a struc-
ture fire, as it provides the incident commander with
a designated emergency team and thereby eliminates
the need for reassigning other fire fighters to this
duty during a critical period. The RIC's primary duty
is to respond to emergencies in which fire fighters
are trapped, lost, or disoriented in a burning struc-
ture. Under optimum conditions, an RIC should
respond with the first alarm to eliminate later re-
sponse time.  The RIC should be equipped with full
turnout gear, SCBAs, portable radios and lights,
axes, forcible entry tools, hooks, and other equip-
ment needed for the rescue effort.  The RIC should
report directly to the incident commander and be
nearby to await rescue commands.  An RIC should
consist of at least  two fire fighters, but the size and
complexity of the incident dictates the size of the
RIC.
5.  Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous ar-
eas (such as burning or suspected unsafe struc-
tures) to maintain two-way communications with
the incident commander.
Lack of effective communications on the fireground
can result in tragic loss of life.  Fire fighters who
enter burning structures must be able to communi-
cate with the incident commander about interior
conditions, the need for additional support, and
emergencies that require rescue or response teams.
Effective communications are of primary impor-
tance to the incident commander in decision mak-
ing, overall operations, and safety on the fireground.
6.  Ensure that standard operating procedures and
equipment are adequate and sufficient to support
radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes.
Communications become ineffective at the fire
scene when radio traffic becomes so heavy that
messages cannot be understood.  The ambient noise
on the fireground further hampers effective com-
munication.  Specified channels should bePhoto courtesy of National Institute of Standards and Technology
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used for the tactical channel and dispatch to pre-
vent competition for air time.  Radio traffic can be
reduced if users
 avoid unnecessary transmissions,
 are brief but accurate,
 speak clearly,
 wait for the air channel to clear, and
 allow priority for emergencies and
     rescues.
The standard operating procedures, personnel, and
communications equipment should be of sufficient
quality and quantity to support the volume of com-
munications encountered at various types of fire
scenes.  Fire department communication policies
should include a standard operating procedure for
the delivery and acknowledgment of "emergency
traffic" at the incident scene.  Common terminol-
ogy must be readily identifiable by all personnel at
the incident scene and by the dispatcher or
telecommunicator in all communications centers.
7.  Provide all fire fighters with PASS devices
and make sure that they wear and activate them
when they are involved in fire fighting, rescue,
or other hazardous duties.
PASS devices are designed to set off an audible
alarm when a fire fighter becomes motionless for
30 seconds.  However, a primary complaint about
PASS devices is that the alarm often sounds while
fire fighters are on standby or in a rest period. The
alarm is manufactured so that any movement by
the fire fighter should reset the alarm.   Also, the
fire fighter can manually activate the PASS device
alarm whenever assistance is required.
The PASS device should be worn by fire fight-
ers and activated whenever they operate in a haz-
ardous area. The devices are not designed to be
heard outside a building, but they are intended
to alert nearby fire fighters or officers that some-
one is missing, lost, or trapped.  An activated
PASS alarm will also help an RIC find lost or
trapped fire fighters.
8.  Conduct prefire planning and inspections that
cover all building materials and components of
a structure.
Prefire inspections are an excellent opportunity for
fire departments to determine the following:
Age of the structure
Structural integrity
Exposed interior insulation materials
Type of roof structure and supports
(truss, bow, etc.)
Type of interior support structures
Type of materials used in the structure
(such as wood, steel, plastics, foam, or
materials that produce toxic gases when
subjected to heat)
Storage of flammable or toxic materials
Amount of load (for example, heavy
heating and cooling units) on roof
structures that could weaken the supports
Water supply
Automatic sprinkler systems
Truss roofs should be evaluated for a minimum fire
resistance rating of 1 hour.  Each structure in a
multistructure (such as a strip mall) should receive
a prefire inspection to determine the interior design
and types of materials used in construction.
9.  Transmit an audible tone or alert immedi-
ately when conditions become unsafe for fire
fighters.
An emergency evacuation is ordered when an ex-
tremely serious emergency has occurred or is about
to happen. Examples of such emergencies are miss-
ing fire fighters, explosion, and structural collapse.
Unlike a withdrawal, an emergency evacuation
requires that fire fighters leave behind tools and
hoses and that the incident commander
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conduct a roll call or a head count. An emergency
evacuation is a rare event in fire fighting, and thus
confusion and delay usually occur when it is or-
dered.  For this reason, a prearranged audible sig-
nal should be sounded to alert fire fighters of an
emergency evacuation. Fire departments should
train their members to evacuate the building at
the sound of the signal.
10.   Establish a collapse zone around build-
ings with parapet walls.
A  parapet wall is the continuation of an exterior
wall above the roof level.  A parapet wall has
reduced stability because it has fewer connections
to the rest of the structure and is subject to col-
lapse if it suffers any movement, shock, or vi-
bration during fire-fighting operations.  A col-
lapse zone is the distance from the fire building
equal to the height of the wall.  However, since
the falling wall may break apart and allow flying
debris to cover a greater distance than the height
of the wall, a safety margin should be consid-
ered when establishing a collapse zone. Fire fight-
ers should not be allowed to operate inside a col-
lapse zone. For example, they should not advance
attack lines or conduct staging or fire fighter re-
habilitation within this zone. In addition, hose
streams, deck guns or pipes, portable deluge
nozzles, and aerial ladders with fire fighters op-
erating at the tip or inside buckets should oper-
ate outside the collapse zone.
8   Structural Collapse
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS REFERENCES CITED
The principal contributors to this Alert were Ted
Pettit, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH;
Vincent Dunn, Deputy Chief (retired), New York
City Fire Department; and Greg Main, District
Chief, Evansville Indiana Fire Department. Rita
Fahy, NFPA, provided the NFPA data. Ted Pettit,
Richard Braddee, and Frank Washenitz, Fire Fighter
Investigation Team, Division of Safety Research,
NIOSH, investigated the cases used. Kim Clough,
Health Effects Laboratory Division, NIOSH, cre-
ated the document design and layout.  Jason Britton,
Health Effects Laboratory Division, NIOSH, cre-
ated the Web document.
Please direct any comments, questions, or requests
for additional information to the following:
Dr. Nancy A. Stout, Director
Division of Safety Research




Telephone: 3042855894; or call
180035NIOSH (18003564674)
We greatly appreciate your assistance in protecting
the health of U.S. workers.
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H.
Director, National Institute for
   Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and
   Prevention
CFR. Code of Federal regulations.  Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the
Federal Register.
Dunn V [1988]. Collapse of burning buildings: a
guide to fireground safety. Saddle Brook, NJ: Penn
Well.
NFPA [1995a]. NFPA 220: standard on types of
building construction. Quincy, MA: National Fire
Protection Association.
NFPA [1995b]. NFPA 1561: standard on fire de-
partment incident management system.  Quincy,
MA: National Fire Protection Association.
NFPA [1996]. NFPA 1404: standard for a fire de-
partment self-contained breathing apparatus pro-
gram.  Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation.
NFPA [1997a]. NFPA 1500: standard on fire de-
partment occupational safety and health program.
Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.
NFPA [1997b]. NFPA 1971: standard on protec-
tive ensemble for structural fire fighting. Quincy,
MA: National Fire Protection Association.
NFPA [1997c]. NFPA 1981: standard on open-cir-
cuit self-contained breathing apparatus for the fire
service. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection As-
sociation.
NFPA [1998]. NFPA 1982: standard on personal
alert safety systems (PASS). Quincy, MA: National
Fire Protection Association.
NFPA [1999]. Personal communication from Rita
Fahy, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,
MA, to Ted Pettit, Division of Safety Research,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Centers for Disease Control, Public Health
Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Morgantown, WV.
Structural Collapse   9
NIOSH [1996]. Sudden roof collapse of a burning
auto parts store claims the lives of two fire fight-
ersVirginia.  Morgantown, WV: U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Fatality Assessment and Control Evalua-
tion (FACE) Report 96-17.
NIOSH [1997]. Floor collapse in a single family
dwelling fire claims the life of one fire fighter and
injures anotherKentucky. Morgantown, WV:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, Fatality Assessment and
Control Evaluation (FACE) Report 97-04.
NIOSH [1998a]. Commercial structure fire claims
the life of one fire fighterCalifornia.
Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatal-
ity Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE)
Report 98-F07.
NIOSH [1998b]. Fire fighter dies while fighting
warehouse fire when parapet wall collapsesVer-
mont. Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
(FACE) Report 98-F20.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brunacini A [1985].  Fire command. Quincy,
MA:  National Fire Protection Association.
Dunn V [1992].  Safety and survival on the fire
ground. Saddle Brook, NJ: Penn Well.
Dunn V [1996].  Systems analysis/size-up: part
1.  Firehouse Magazine (Oct).
Dunn V [1996].  Systems analysis/size-up: part
2.  Firehouse Magazine (Dec).
International Fire Service Training Association
[1995]. Essentials of fire fighting. 3rd ed.
Stillwater, OK:  Oklahoma State University, Fire
Protection Publications.
Kipp JD,  Loflin ME [1996].  Emergency inci-
dent risk management. New York, NY: Van
Nostrand Reinhold.
NFPA [1997].  Fire protection handbook. 18th ed.
Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.
10   Structural Collapse
Structural Collapse   11
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention




Penalty for private use $300
Call NIOSH at 1-800-35-NIOSH (1-800-356-4674)
Fax number: (513) 533-8573
E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov
Visit the NIOSH Web site at:  www.cdc.gov/niosh
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 99-146
